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Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated that asset prices react rapidly, if 
at all, to news published in the mass media. In many cases, the information has 
been discounted and prices have already moved upon primary publication through 
news wires, press releases or firm announcements. Any remaining information is 
usually quickly priced in after dissemination through the mass media. But not al-
ways: Often enough delayed price adjustments, underreactions as well as overre-
actions, can be observed after particular news reports have been published. This 
points to inadequacies in the efficient markets hypothesis as well as in Behavioral 
Finance theories: Delayed reactions appear too often to be explained away as 
“anomalies” within models of rational pricing. But they appear too eratically to 
be explained as “normalities” such as in newer models of systematically irrational 
pricing. In other words: Asset prices frequently do not react to news published in 
the media. Sometimes they do. The evidence leads to the following conclusion:
That markets can be efficient and inefficient at the same time.
  2 








News Events and Price Movements.  
Price Effects of Economic and Non-Economic Publica-
tions in the Mass Media 
 
Synchronization was perfect and after the event, commentators in the media 
shuddered to acknowledge it. The signs of destruction left no room for doubt 
about the perpetrators' intentions: The plan was to hit the core of capitalism, 
symbol and control center of the globalized economy, in a coolly calculated 
strike. The Northern Tower had just gone up in flames when many TV sta-
tions were already broadcasting live. At the moment when the Twin Towers 
collapsed, a good hour later, the international public had tuned in.
1 The whole 
world was watching as, on the sunny morning of September 11th 2001, the 
World Trade Center was reduced to a pile of rubble. 
The tremendous speed of the realtime-conflict forces a rapid counter-
reaction. The response of the world’s financial markets is immediate and se-
vere: The London Stock Exchange experiences the heaviest crash in its his-
tory, the FTSE 100-Index falls by 5.7 per cent. The CAC 40-Index in Paris 
loses 7.4 per cent. Also in Frankfurt, panic selling is reported and the DAX 
loses 8.5 per cent of its value – one of the largest daily price losses in its his-
tory. The Nikkei-Index in Tokio drops below 10,000 points for the first time 
since 1984.
2 In return, the prices for gold and crude oil sharply increase. The 
Dollar plunges. The shock waves of the news from New York shake markets 
around the globe. 
No doubt: This is an emergency. Decision makers in the central banks are 
conscious of this fact: The U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, The European Central 
Bank, the Bank of Japan and many of their colleagues in the international pru-
dential supervision and regulatory agencies hold crisis talks. They hasten to 
assure the markets that they will allocate the necessary funds in order to keep 
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international payment systems operational and avoid an imminent financial 
collapse. Interest rates are lowered, and substantial financial aid is dispensed 
to protect the industries directly concerned from the worst.
3 
Markets continue to vibrate for quite some time from the psychological 
shock of the terrorist attacks. In fact, the financial fallout at the target of the 
attack, Wall Street, is relatively small in comparison: Stockbroking does not 
even start on September 11th and remains closed for several days, which pre-
vents immediate shock reactions. Hardly two months later, and thus much 
faster than many other international stock exchanges in regions far away from 
the explosion, the U.S.-indices reach the level they had before the attacks.
4 
But most other international indices recover in the medium term as well. It 
seems as if the serious price losses immediately after the attacks, particularly 
in Europe, were overreactions triggered by the shock. 
Undoubtedly, it is the incredibility of the events “as such” that causes these 
overreactions. However, it is not physical violence alone that defines the sig-
nificance of this world event, but also its psychological multiplication through 
simultaneous global broadcasting in the mass media. The whole  world is 
watching, knowing that the rest of the world is watching. Accordingly, reac-
tions are vehement. Although it is impossible to separate the event itself from 
its media broadcast – the two are inseparably intertwined –, there is a lot to be 
said for the fact that the specific quality of the cataclysm is due to its deliber-
ate realization as a media event.
5 In view of this, it is appropriate to assume an 
autonomous share of the media in these (over)reactions. 
 
1. Introduction 
A whole industry lives on it: Investment magazines, financial networks and 
business papers, even the general daily press, convey the impression that in-
formation selected and presented by them permits conclusions about future 
movements of the stock markets. The media as well as certain market observ-
ers seem to maintain that business news circulating in public have a signifi-
cant, economically realizable and relevant information content. Some even 
suppose that business news provoke systematic price movements in the finan-
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cial markets. As it seems, the media are not just observers, they are movers of 
markets. 
“Knowing what will be important” is the slogan of the German edition of 
the Financial Times. “Facts make money” explains the German investment 
magazine  Focus Money. “Profit from it” promises US finance television 
CNBC. Such slogans nurture the idea of news producers as visionary fore-
casters or powerful movers of markets. It is in the media’s commercial interest 
to convince the public that their news move stock prices. For the higher the 
potential of business coverage to forecast or influence stock prices, the higher 
the benefit that can be expected from intensive media consumption. This again 
increases the incentive to buy such media products. 
Actual or supposed market manipulations also nurture the idea of the media 
as influential movers of stock prices: In numerous cases, business journalists 
or their contact persons in the industry were accused of having influenced in-
vestment behavior through well-directed publications of investment tips and 
exaggerated forecasts of price movements in order to manipulate the prices of 
certain market values.
6 For some time, such attempts of instrumentalizing the 
press and television became the content of media coverage themselves.
7 Sup-
posed manipulation attempts in financial shows on television received particu-
lar attention.
8 
On the other hand, many investors had to realize with the breakdown of the 
New Economy that the potential of the business media to move stock prices is 
a lot smaller than individual cases of manipulation seem to suggest: While the 
media were still dreaming of a permanent stock market upswing, the financial 
markets crashed and shattered the hopes of many investors. But the journalists 
stuck to their positive message: Even in the middle of the stock market crisis, 
the number of buy recommendations by far exceeded the number of sell rec-
ommendations.
9 Obviously, the business media neither serve as an early warn-
ing system nor as reliable forecasters or makers of stock prices. Is the pub-
lished information not relevant to stock prices after all? 
Despite self-confident statements of certain media or finance professionals, 
the actual quality of the interaction of markets and the media is far from being 
established. On the part of finance studies, the topic has received a lot of at-
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tention, mainly in connection with the question how exactly information is 
processed in the financial markets. This is based on a very narrow definition 
of “information content” that reduces the term to news contents which pro-
voke prompt stock price movements. Media studies has mostly analyzed the 
effects of business news from the point of view of a supposed influence on 
voters' behavior, thus in a political context, if at all.
10 So far, the interaction of 
markets and the media has not been studied by this discipline. 
In the following, the results of empirical research on the functioning of data 
processing in the financial markets will be extracted and examined in a quali-
tative meta-analysis. The goal is to understand the immediate effects of the 
media on financial markets. As a synthesis of the existing material will show, 
a long-term analysis reveals recurring patterns. There is a relationship between 
markets and the media, the media can have an effect on the markets. However, 
there is only a limited possibility of summarizing how this happens in univer-
sally applicable terms. The following questions are to be answered: Do news 
published in the mass media have an immediate effect on financial markets? 
And if yes, in which way? 
 
2. State of the Art: "Random Walks" and "Irrational Exuberance"  
Do news have price effects on the financial markets or not? This question is 
part of a central and heated debate in economics which is far from being set-
tled. In numerous studies, exponents of empirical capital market research have 
come to the conclusion that new information is reflected in stock prices 
quickly and without considerable delay. This is why they call markets “effi-
cient” and consider news to be generally ineffective.
11 Advocates of Beha-
vioral Finance, however, document multiple cases of delayed price reactions 
after the arrival of new information and therefore describe the markets as “in-
efficient”.
12 They consider the news in the media to be potentially effective. 
The theoretical premises of the two approaches and their implications could 
hardly be more different: As Paul Samuelson (1965) explains in his classic 
text “Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly”, the current 
price of a stock is the best estimate of its true value. If the correct future price 
was already known, according to Samuelson, the price would immediately 
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move into this direction. But this, precisely, is not the case. As a consequence, 
price fluctuations come about. The theory says, according to Eugene Fama’s 
(1970) classic definition of the “efficient market hypothesis” „that security 
prices at any time ‘fully reflect’ all available information”.
13 A specification of 
this sentence shows that price formation in the financial markets follows a 
random walk.
14 In brief: In a market reacting efficiently to information, stock 
price changes cannot be predicted.
15 
The concept of efficient markets implies that the analysis and evaluation of 
information available to the public does not promise above-average returns. If 
stock prices only react to future, i.e. unknown, data, accessible news, as they 
are disseminated by the mass media, are almost irrelevant to price formation. 
They are anticipated by the market. Price adjustments which have not been re-
alized prior to publication take place without any delay.
16 In a nutshell: The 
prices already “contain” the news. As a result, prices always represent an ade-
quate reflection of fundamental values.
17 An analysis of media contents in or-
der to find future price patterns thus is obsolete because it would not create an 
additional value. For there are no future price patterns that could be derived. 
Conclusions from newer, behavioral approaches are different: Behavioral 
Finance, which is based on findings from psychology, sociology and anthro-
pology, has emphatically pointed out the existence of so-called “market ano-
malies”. This is a term for price movements which seem to contradict the ex-
planations of models of rational economic behavior.
18  Factors in the market 
environment, according to these observations, seem to lead to deviations of 
prices from their rationally justifiable levels. Stock prices divert more or less 
strongly from fundamental values.
19 Irrational exaggerations and price “bub-
bles” are possible consequences. In brief: Stock prices do not (always) follow 
a random distibution.  
The considerations of Behavioral Finance imply that the reports of the 
news media can be relevant for stock prices. As stock prices under- or overre-
act to good or bad news, the mass media are of importance: because they in-
tensify such market reactions or perhaps even provoke them themselves. 
Robert Shiller (1999) writes on this: “It appears as if stock prices overreact to 
some news […] before investors come to their senses and correct the prices.”
20 
As far as they arouse public interest, influence public opinion and unify inves-
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tor behavior, the media potentially are a central factor in understanding the 
dynamics of financial markets. 
In sum: Finance research provides substantial evidence for the fact that 
media reports have an impact on stock prices. And it provides substantial evi-
dence for the fact that media reports do not have an impact on stock prices.  
Media research has dealt with the topic, if at all, from a different perspec-
tive: Special priority has been given to the problem of insiders in business co-
verage and potential conflicts of interest resulting from this.
21 The reason for 
these studies were cases in which journalists, who were in close contact with 
actors in the financial markets and thus became de facto insiders, used their 
non-public knowledge for personal enrichment – for example by publishing 
stock recommendations for companies they had business relations with in or-
der to make speculative gains.
22  
Criticism of these occurences is based on the assumption, which is at least 
implied, that the business media could have an influence on investor behavior. 
If the media were without influence, discussions about unethical behavior of 
journalists would be without practical relevance, since no negative con-
sequences were to be expected from journalists breaching regulations. These 
negative consequences are insinuated, however, if one urges journalists to deal 
responsibly with their audience and warns of manipulations.
23 The scant ap-
proaches in media research in this regard therefore at least implicitly assume 
that news have at least a punctual effect on investor behavior and can lead to 
market distortions through manipulative influencing of investors. 
Only recently have there been attempts to systematically analyze the in-
teraction of markets and the media in communication research. Schuster (2000a 
and 2001c) provides solid evidence for the fact that the role of the mass media 
has to be taken into account for an understanding of the dynamics of financial 
markets. There is sufficient proof that cause-effect-relations which can be ea-
sily isolated are the exception rather than the rule. Extraordinary price move-
ments after stock recommendations for example are only an exception. How-
ever, it can by no means be deduced that the media do not have any effect and 
that secondary information in the mass media does not have an influence on 
price formation. The media can produce manifest as well as latent effects. 
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3. News Effects: Rapid Return Reactions 
Piles of studies of empirical financial market research make it evident: De-
layed effects of news do not represent the norm. Even on days when “big 
events” dominate headlines in the media, according to Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers (1989), the price movements that occur are rather small most of the 
time. On the other hand, many of the largest market movements take place on 
days without significant events in the news. Generally speaking, it seems to be 
true that no systematic relationship can be established between the publication 
of business and other news in the media and consequent substantial stock 
price changes in the financial markets. Market prices fluctuate, but often the 
news are not very important. And vice versa. 
This result has been and is still underpinned by exponents of the theory of 
efficient markets in a large number of event studies: Stock prices react quickly 
to new information, even before it is published by the news media. Effects of 
new information on stock prices in the form of systematic and delayed price 
reactions do not represent the rule. On the contrary: Fama, Fisher, Jensen and 
Roll (1969) already point out in their study on market reactions to stocks splits 
“that stock prices adjust very rapidly to new information.”
24 Shortly after the 
announcement of splits, the authors state, mostly within one day only, the 
relevant price adjustments have been carried out.
25 Therefore, it is usually im-
possible to achieve an abnormal gain by reacting to such data. 
Ball and Brown (1968) look at market reactions to the publication of ac-
counting income numbers in the Wall Street Journal. Their result: The major 
part of new information is anticipated in stock prices in the preceding months. 
The actual publication in the newspaper hardly has got any measurable ef-
fect.
26 “The market”, according to Dimson and Mussavian (2000), “appears to 
anticipate the information, and most of the price adjustment is complete be-
fore the event is revealed to the market. When news is released, the remaining 
price adjustment takes place rapidly and accurately.“
27 The conclusion from 
this is the following: That published information does not permit forecasts of 
stock price changes. 
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A multitude of event studies provide evidence for the speed with which the 
market really reacts. For example to companies' press releases: Patell and 
Wolfson (1984) demonstrate that price movements in connection with divi-
dend and earnings announcements through the Dow Jones News Service set in 
prior to publication. The main boost in stock prices follows five to fifteen mi-
nutes after the publication. Sixty to ninety minutes later, price adjustments are 
for the most part concluded.
28 While earnings announcements at least seem to 
trigger significant price movements around the publication date, the reactions 
to dividend announcements are weak and only worth mentioning in case of 
dividend changes. If price movements occur at all after dividend announce-
ments, these are carried out very quickly. 
Similar results are available for the German market: Gerke, Oerke and 
Sentner (1997) investigate market reactions to the publication of dividend 
changes in business newswires and in the business paper Handelsblatt for the 
period from 1987 to 1994. Their findings show that stock prices react to divi-
dend increases with abnormal returns of about one per cent on the same day; 
after that, there are no noticeable price fluctuations.
29 The situation is differ-
ent, however, for negative surprises: Dividend decreases and dividend omis-
sions are responded to with immediate declines in prices, but this reaction 
does not stop until several days later. In addition, it is striking that a signifi-
cant share of the price adjustment only happens when the information has 
been disseminated in the press (and not after the agency report). 
In many cases, the processing of information happens very quickly. Röder 
(2000a) comes to the conclusion that a certain type of company report, so-
called ad hoc-announcements, are processed very smoothly for companies 
listed in the DAX. After the publication date, no abnormal price movements 
can be established. The price reaction sets in during the first 15 minutes after 
publication and the major part of it is completed within the first hour of trad-
ing.
30 Stock prices of smaller companies, however, can show delayed price re-
actions to company news, even on the day after the publication. But these 
theoretical excess returns that can be observed with hindsight can hardly be 
realized in practice since the transactions costs exceed the potential gain.  
Positive firm announcements, according to the results of Woodruff and 
Senchack (1988) on the American market, are reflected especially rapidly in 
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stock prices. Mostly, they have already been anticipated at the time of their 
publication. May (1994) and Röder (2000b) present similar test results for the 
German stock exchange. The general maxim seems to be: “Good news is no 
news.”
31  Negative information can cause stronger price fluctuations, espe-
cially in a positive market environment, by increasing insecurity about pros-
pects for the future.
32 But even such negative information is mostly processed 
without greater delays. Outsiders, who buy after the public dissemination, usu-
ally do not have time to react to them. The market (re)acts (very) quickly. 
But not always. Stice (1991) proves that the publication method can have 
an impact on the price response: Accounting income numbers, which do not 
produce a measurable effect at the time of their obligatory publication, might 
very well do so when they are published in the Wall Street Journal at a later 
date. Possibly, this is a violation of the efficient market theory, according to 
which republications should not produce abnormal price fluctuations. This 
could hint at autonomous media effects because the newspaper articles do not 
contain any new information. However, the figures Stice presents on move-
ments of prices and volumes are hardly significant economically. Moreover, 
they concern very small companies – and their stock prices usually react more 
slowly because they are not in the public eye.  
Beaver (1986) already provides evidence for the fact that stock prices and 
volumes of trade can react to the publication of accounting income numbers: 
He documents abnormal returns and turnovers around the publication date and 
concludes that the accounting income reports do have an information content. 
Comparable extraordinary trading activities after the publication of accounting 
income numbers have been shown for smaller companies: Bamber (1986) for 
example reports above-average turnovers at the time of earnings announce-
ments in the Wall Street Journal, particularly for stocks in narrow markets. If 
the returns are unexpectedly high, the stocks concerned can show increased 
trading volume. Both Beaver's and Bamber's results indicate that extraordi-
nary trading activities come to an end very quickly. 
Rapidity in information processing seems to be the norm in the majority of 
cases. Announcements of data concerning the national economy provoke par-
ticularly rapid reactions on the markets – if they react at all. For example in-
flation numbers: Schwert (1981) shows that the stock market often reacts only 
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weakly to the release of inflation rates.
33 Pearce and Roley (1985) also find 
only very weak evidence of price reactions to inflation rates. Jain (1988) repli-
cates these results: Inflation rate, industrial production or unemployment rate 
– the release of these statistics mostly does not lead to any remarkable change 
in stock prices. If corresponding effects occur, they do so very quickly, gener-
ally within one hour.
34 After that, the price effect has been exhausted.
35 
Interest and currency markets react even more quickly than the stock mar-
kets. Ederington and Lee (1993 and 1995) demonstrate that in these markets, 
price reactions begin to set in shortly after the publication of macroeconomic 
data. The main price adjustments take place within only one minute. “[…] 
Trading profits based on the initial reaction basically disappear within this pe-
riod“, the authors say.
36 Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2002) reveal 
how surprising macro-economic information can influence exchange rates. 
The rates react abruptly with negative information provoking much stronger 
reactions than positive information. In general: Exchange rates respond in-
stantly to the release of economic information.
37 
Maloney and Mulherin (1998) show in a case study on the explosion of the 
Challenger space shuttle in 1986 that even particularly surprising non-eco-
nomic news is rapidly processed by the markets: Within 13 minutes of the 
agency report about the crash of the space shuttle in the Dow Jones News 
Wire, which was published eight minutes after the explosion, the stocks of se-
veral companies involved in the production of the shuttle went down. The 
price of one particular stock was hit especially hard. While the stock market 
prices of the other companies quickly recovered, this stock continued to go 
down in value during the day. It turned out several weeks later that this was 




4. Irregular Price Regularities 
Recent studies on the aggregative level of news and price fluctuations clarify 
that the relationship between markets and the media does not obey to any 
simple rule: Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) correlated news published in the 
Dow Jones News Service and the Wall Street Journal with stock market prices 
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and trading volumes between 1983 and 1990 – more than 750,000 headlines. 
Their results show a moderate relationship of news variables with trading vol-
umes, but only a weak relation with stock returns. “While we find a direct, ro-
bust relation between Dow Jones news stories and stock market activity“, the 
authors write, “the observed relation is often as weak as that reported in prior 
research.”
39 
Berry and Howe (1994) present similar results: Using Reuter’s News Ser-
vice as an example, their study illustrates that the news flow in the course of 
one trading day follows a typical pattern: The volume of news increases dur-
ing the first hours of trading, reaches its peak shortly after the close and abates 
afterwards. Berry and Howe find a similar pattern for stock exchange transac-
tions. The returns, however, do not show any remarkable correlation.
40 Studies 
carried out by McQueen and Roley (1993), however, show that the effects of 
macroeconomic news vary with the economic climate – and that they could 
possibly be stronger than assumed up to now: If the economy is already 
booming, positive news reports seem to provoke negative price reactions, 
whereas they lead to (weak) positive reactions in a less favorable economic 
climate. 
Depending on the overall market situation, identical news thus seems to 
provoke different price reactions. This indicates that the state of the market as 
well as perceptions and psychological dispositions of market participants play 
a greater role than assumed by advocates of the efficient market hypothesis. 
Assymetrical price movements in response to comparable news give grounds 
to believe that investors overreact in some cases and underreact in others. The 
psychological disposition of the market seems to constitute a framework for 
behavior within which investors carry out their transactions. This no longer 
excludes the possibility that prices may divert from their fundamental values. 
Or, to put it differently: Reactions of the market are sometimes more, some-
times less efficient. 
Under certain circumstances, stock market prices (but also prices in other 
markets) can overreact or underreact. Underreaction means that the average 
return after a publication is higher than the return of the benchmark indices. In 
other words, the price reacts to the news with a certain delay, an error which is 
corrected afterwards through above average returns. It is only gradually that 
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the news is integrated into stock prices. Overreaction means that the average 
return after a publication is lower than the return of the benchmark index. The 
price prematurely reacts to the news, an error, which is corrected afterwards 
with lower returns. The news is integrated too strongly into stock market 
prices.
41 
Underreactions to the publication of accounting income numbers can be 
considered well documented: Positive earnings surprises can lead to excess re-
turns and higher trading volume beyond the event day. Several event studies 
demonstrate that positive surprises lead to excess returns over a period of sev-
eral months (so-called post-event price drift).
42  This means that in certain 
cases, business news can (also) be followed by successive price changes 
which correlate, therefore constitute a trend and are, as it seems, economically 
significant.
43 Cutler et al. (1991) prove positive autocorrelations for a time-
span of up to one year for returns in various international markets, including 
stock, currency and real-estate markets: It seems to be true for a broad range 
of asset classes that excess returns are slightly interrelated.
44 
Chan (2002) demonstrates that abnormal returns can occur after the publi-
cation of business news. In his research of market reactions to publications in 
the news media such as the Wall Street Journal, the Chicago Tribune, the 
NewYork Times and the Washington Post, it turns out that stock market prices, 
particularly quotations of smaller companies, can fall behind their benchmark 
index after the publication of bad news. “It seems to take a long time“, Chan 
states, “for news in headlines to affect prices.”
45 If positive information is pub-
lished, excess returns are less pronounced, but still measurable.
46 To put it dif-
ferently: (Especially negative) business news (sometimes) has a lasting effect. 
Besides underreactions, overreactions have also repeatedly been observed 
in empirical studies: In their pioneering study on this phenomenon, Werner De 
Bondt and Richard Thaler (1985) found out that former over-performers turn 
into losers in the medium term, and vice versa: undervalued stocks seem to 
beat previous winning stocks.
47  The authors see the reason for such turn-
arounds in prices in investors' overreactions. In his book Irrational Exuber-
ance Robert Shiller (2000) mentions the mass media as an important factor in 
the generation of overreactions: Due to their capacity to arouse attention, 
Shiller says, the media can create positive feedback and reinforce existant 
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trends – and contribute to the reinforcement of speculative price movements 
and financial bubbles.
48 
The central result of the studies on overreactions is that stock market prices 
can show successive (slightly) negative autocorrelations for an event space of 
several months up to a few years: The initial overreaction is followed by a 
market price correction, the return decreases and comes closer to the average. 
Of course this implies that stock market prices would have to be predictable if 
these price fluctuations occured systematically and could be attributed to cer-
tain behavioral dispositions of the market participants. In so far as the mass 
media contribute to the “overdrive” in investor behavior by focussing public 
attention, they have to be taken into consideration as the potential driving 
force behind this “irrational exuberance”.
49 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) draw up a model of mood changes 
among investors which could cause such fluctuations. They find an explana-
tion in the phenomenon, well-known to psychologists, that people attach too 
much significance to information that is particularly striking.
50 Accordingly, a 
sequence of good or bad news
51, which already generates increased interest in 
itself, could induce investors to extrapolate a trend. Overreactions to news, 
which are followed by a deviation of stock market prices from their funda-
mental values, can thus be explained. If the news are extraordinarily striking, 
these exaggerations even seem highly probable. Unobtrusive information, 
which receives little attention, would accordingly lead to underreactions.
52  
It is therefore theoretically possible that striking media events in particular 
lead to overvaluations among investors and, as a consequence, to overreac-
tions. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny deduce the following prognosis: „The the-
ory predicts that, holding the weight of information constant, one-time strong 
news events should generate an overreaction. […] For example, stock prices 
bounced back strongly in the few weeks after the crash of 1987. One in-
terpretation of the crash is that investors overreacted to the news of panic sell-
ing by other investors even though there was little fundamental news about 
security values. Thus the crash was a high-strength, low-weight news event 
which, according to the theory, should have caused an overreaction.”
53 
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It is not at all certain that over- and underreactions are „pervasive regulari-
ties”.
54 What is striking, however, is that price movements, which seemed to 
be abnormal from the point of view of traditional financial theory, apparently 
occur with a relatively high frequency.
55 It remains to be seen if they really in-
terfere with the theory. As many authors point out, there is also room for 
slight anomalies in traditional efficiency concepts.
56 However, unusual interre-
lations of markets and the media intimate that finance theory has too long fol-
lowed a very simplistic formula, when it philosophized about frictionless in-
formation processing. Market activities following strong stimuli coming from 
the media also show, though, that modern financial economics is also off the 
mark if it generally infers systematic stock price regularities from behavioral 
regularities.  
 
5. World Events: The Effects of "Big News" 
The effects of major media events on the financial markets represent a litmus 
test for the prognoses of recent behavioral approaches – a test that they only 
pass in part. According to the theory, conspicuous news events would have to 
lead to irrational price fluctuations, due to their increased visibility and fol-
lowing overreactions of many investors (and not to their fundamental informa-
tion content). In other words: The more visibly an event appears in the media, 
the stronger price reactions should be, regardless of how significant the event 
is “in itself”. The few empirical studies on the market effects of big media 
events only provide mixed evidence in this regard. 
Ray Fair (2000) for example tried to establish a relationship between major 
price movements and relevant news for the U.S.- stock market between 1982 
and 1999. In order to do this, he looked for extraordinary price activities, de-
fined as price changes of more than 0.75 per cent within five minutes, on 
4,417 trading days. He found such price reactions on 179 days. In the follow-
ing, the archives of four news providers, the Dow Jones News Service, the As-
sociated Press Newswire, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, 
were searched for extraordinary media events. The result: Significant events, 
which could be considered triggers of the market activities, were found for 
(only) 58 of the 179 days.
57 On 121 days with strong price flucutations, there 
was no important news. 
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In the first place, the existence of strong price fluctuations despite the ab-
sence of corresponding media reports only implies that there must be other 
reasons apart from the mass media to account for abnormally strong fluctua-
tions on certain days. What is remarkable, however, is the existence of the op-
posite phenomenon: There are several news events which do not provoke any 
unusual price movements – although they seem to be very similar to the news 
actually moving prices. Fair writes: „There have, for example, been hundreds 
of important macroeconomic announcements between 1982 and 1999, and 
only a small fraction have led to a large stock price change. An adequate 
model would need to explain why particular events […] led to large price 
changes, while many other seemingly similar events did not.“
58 
The most important study on the financial and economic effects of “big” 
events underpins these findings: „Many of the largest market movements in 
recent years have occurred on days when there were no major news events.”
59 
This result of the study “What Moves Stock Prices” by Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers (1989) shows the limits of the importance of news (and the events 
behind them) in explaining the dynamics of financial markets: Even the big-
gest price changes frequently occur without prior news – which doubtless 
means that price variance which cannot be explained by fundamental eco-
nomic factors cannot simply and unambiguously be deduced from external 
events and the following media coverage either.
60 
Nevertheless, there are numerous examples of far-reaching events in the 
news – economic policy measures, political events, international conflicts and 
war – which have substantial effects on the whole market: The Standard & 
Poor’s Composite Stock Index for example lost 4.37 per cent on the Monday 
after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The American declaration of war 
against Japan on the next day was followed by a loss of 3.23 per cent. The nu-
clear bomb attack on Nagasaki made a difference of 1.65 per cent. On the an-
nouncement of the deployment of Russian nuclear missiles on Cuba in Octo-
ber 1962, the market lost 2.67 per cent. After President Kennedy was assassi-
nated, stocks fell by 2.81 per cent. The biggest plunge occured due to a medi-
cal event: After President Eisenhower’s heart attack in the fall of 1955, the 
market fell by 6.62 per cent.
61 
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Niederhoffer (1971) states that big, but isolated news, which only flash in 
the media for one day, provoke less price movements than series of consecu-
tive big news, as they occur in times of international crises. Evidently, conse-
cutive and interrelated big news, like those during the Korean War or the Cu-
ban Missile Crisis, lead to an aggregate effect which makes increased market 
activities more probable. It is, however, not clear whether this observation 
supports the theory of Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny that  „one-time strong 
news events should generate an overreaction” or rather calls it into question.
62 
It is clear, on the other hand, that big news can bring about overreactions. But 
how much of those are due to media influence? 
In cases of strong price reactions, it is fair to assume that there is a causal 
relationship with media coverage (and the events behind it). Nevertheless, this 
cannot be stated without any doubt. For the fact that a piece of news is fol-
lowed by price movements is no conclusive proof of a causal relationship. 
Pure coincidence could play a role as well. Quite frequently, the direction of 
the price movement is different from what would be expected with regard to 
the “direction” of the event: The 1.65 per cent movement after Nagasaki for 
instance was positive. The 0.73 per cent change on the day the attempt to lib-
erate American hostages in Iran failed as well. In brief: Big news can cause 
big price movements – but it is hardly possible to say in advance which and 
into what direction.  
Niederhoffer (1971) finds a slight tendency indicating that events which are 
usually considered rather positive are more frequently followed by price in-
creases. The other way round, price losses tend to occur more often after cov-
erage of negative events. However, the difference is minimal: Accordingly, 
news about peace negotiations are followed by price increases in 58 per cent 
of all cases, whereas the same happens in only 50 per cent of all cases after 
reports of hostile negotiations.
63 That these regularities are irregular can easily 
be seen from the fact that (actually negative) reports about an aggravation of 
international tensions lead to a price increase in 62.5 per cent of all cases and 
that “extremely bad” news generally tend to bring about price gains.  
Even incidents in the same event-category do not always produce the same 
effects. Like terrorist attacks: Chen and Siems (2002a) demonstrate that „ter-
rorist attacks and military invasions have great potential to effect capital mar-
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kets around the world in a short period of time.”
64 But an analysis of historical 
examples shows that these effects are highly variable: Sometimes price effects 
occur, sometimes they do not. Sometimes even price increases can be found, 
for example on the day of the Oklahoma City Bombing or the attack on the 
U.S. embassy in Kenia in 1998. It is true, though, that a certain connection be-
tween the dimension of the event and the corresponding market activity seems 
to exist: The fluctuation after September 11th was strong. So were price 
movements after Pearl Harbor or the invasion of Kuwait. 
Most of the ”big” news do not bring about any big and prompt price mo-
vements: Only after 15 out of the 49 big events which Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers identify from 1941 to 1987 follows an index movement of more 
than 1.5 per cent. Many important events are hardly noticed in stock prices: 
The gain during the invasion of the Bay of Pigs is only 0.47 per cent. Reacting 
to the Sovjet invasion of Afghanistan, the S&P rises by 0.11 per cent. On the 
occasion of the assassination attempt on Ronald Reagan, the index only loses 
0.27 per cent. The death of U.S. marines in Libanon in 1983 is a non-event at 
the stock market with a plus of 0.02 per cent. The Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster 
also only makes a small difference of minus 1.06 per cent.
65 Hurricane An-
drew, one of the most severe natural disasters to date in the US is followed by 
an excess return on the event day of minus 0.8 per cent.
66  
Establishing the actual media effects on market activities is complicated by 
the structural problem of separating the effects of the events ”in themselves” 
from the effects of the news. Isolating the two aspects can be very difficult. 
The announcement of a lot of economic policy data and their publication in 
the media for example often happen simultaneously. With increasing real-
time-coverage, events and reports about them will even be less distinguishable 
in the future. The clearest conclusions can be drawn from two types of cases: 
Firstly, those in which no abnormal price movements can be observed, even if 
they are preceded by big events or big news; secondly, those in which strong 
price movements follow journalistic non-events. 
In cases of the first type, which occur quite frequently, it is obvious that 
many times, neither an event nor the coverage of it have an effect. This leads 
to the logical conclusion that there is no conclusive and systematic relation-
ship between big news and big price movements. From cases of the second 
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type, that are found less frequently, but are thus all the more meaningful, the 
existence of autonomous media effects can be deduced, even if these do not 
occur systematically. In real life, repeatedly occuring price movements are 
found following news which have one decisive feature: They themselves are 
the event, since there is no real event behind them. Reactions to such fictitious 
media coverage can sometimes turn out to be very strong.
67 
The thesis of the effectiveness of big media events and resulting market 
overreactions therefore needs considerable qualifications: For the majority of 
news, no significant price correlations can be found. If they appear, they do so 
unsystematically. Often, it remains not only unclear whether reactions will oc-
cur and how strong they will be, but also into which direction they will go. 
Cutler et al. (1989) sum up: „For the set of events we analyze, the average ab-
solute market move is 1.46% in contrast to 0.56% over the entire 1941-1987 
period. These findings suggest a surprisingly small effect of non-economic 
news, at least of the type we have identified, on share prices.“
68 
These observations result in important conclusions both for financial eco-
nomics and for communication research of media impacts on the financial 
markets: The obvious ”ineffectiveness” of many big media events casts seri-
ous doubt on the theory that the conspiciousness of a piece of news alone ex-
plains behavioral overreactions. Evidently, other factors have to be taken into 
account, which condition the effects of news on market activities and the way 
they manifest themselves. A simple one-factor-model, which derives the price 
reaction from the “strength” of the news, does not do justice to the problem. 
“Big” news do provoke “big” market reactions – but often, they simply don’t.  
Dismissing the cases in which media effects do occur as negligible “ano-
malies”, however, would underrate their importance. News have direct and 
short-term as well as indirect and long-term market effects, a quantifiable per-
centage of which is due to the specific mechanisms of information transmis-
sion in the mass media. This observation contradicts the idea of ineffective 
media which is still popular in parts of media effect research.
69 The immedi-
acy of real time communication prevents longer thinking and the absorption of 
public reactions through interpersonal communication. Especially in the fi-
nancial markets, where reaction speed is essential, this can lead to rapid mood 
swings. 
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In these cases, social networks do not lead to a relativization, objectiviza-
tion or attenuation of public reactions to media coverage. On the contrary: 
They can even have a reinforcing effect, making mutual psychological “infec-
tion” possible and facilitating collective panic attacks. Advisers cannot serve 
as a stabilizing factor either: In case of surprising news events, “experts” and 
“opinion leaders” look for advice themselves. More often then not, they suc-
cumb to the immediate power of the events or pursue their own interests on 
the market. 
It is thus correct to refrain from monocausal explanations which try to de-
duce market reactions from media influence alone. Rather, it is a specific con-
stellation of factors which decides the probability of over- or underreactions in 
price formation. If such a process gets going, the media are far from just play-
ing the role of an amplifier. Rather, they are able to contribute to a qualitative 
turn of market acitivites to another level of activity. Under certain circum-
stances, events and their presentation in the news can thus decisively shape 
the character of processes of price formation. In brief: Frequently, news do not 
lead to noticeable market reactions – but sometimes, they do precisely this.  
 
6. Summary 
Price formation in the financial markets is a complex function of diverse fac-
tors whose combination and weight vary with time. The nature of this sys-
temic process makes it impossible to definitely determine to what degree dif-
ferent causes have an effect on prices. Individual factors have more or less 
impact, depending on their specific combination and the actual state of the sy-
stem. It is not only the specific mixture in which certain variables determine 
market activities that is unclear. So far, not even the number and the character 
of the factors which play a role at all has been established. Let alone the inten-
sity of the impact they have on prices.
70 Accordingly, the success rate in ex-
plaining price movements greatly varies – even with hindsight.
71 
Roll (1988) shows that only 40 per cent of the price variation of an average 
stock can be accounted for by general economic influences, industry specific 
conditions and company news releases. That means that a large percentage of 
average price movements cannot be explained by news. Other important fac-
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tors which have not been identified so far must play their part as well. Many 
things which are relevant for price movements happen behind the screen of in-
formation available to the public – we just do not know exactly what they are. 
This relativizes the significance of news in the mass media: They only repre-
sent one among many factors that play a role. A multitude of empirical studies 
shows that news do not lead to any permanent and stable, delayed price reac-
tions (und thus cannot systematically be turned into cash either). 
The attempt to convert news published in the mass media into short-term 
gains is therefore of little use to investors. Market participants anticipate new 
information, insiders use their information lead – most of the time, the infor-
mation content is exhausted before the public comes into play. In many cases, 
there is no immediate relationship between media contents and price move-
ments. Slight underreactions do repeatedly occur in different asset classes. 
Sporadic overreactions due to media coverage and subsequent price correc-
tions are also demonstrable. With regard to the aggregative level, however, it 
is very difficult to make a generalizing statement: Sometimes news do show 
an immediate effect, sometimes they do not.  
In case of big media events and reports about incidents of global signifi-
cance, especially international crises, on the other hand, there is an increased 
probability of abnormal price movements. The conspiciousness of these 
events seems to reinforce the tendency of many investors to react too strongly 
to prominently placed information. Especially consecutive news, which mutu-
ally reinforce each other’s effects, can lead to corresponding overreactions in 
the financial markets. With the current state of knowledge, though, it is hardly 
possible in these cases as well to forecast accurately and ex ante when abnor-
mal price effects will occur, how strong they will be and in which direction 
they will go. If effects do occur, the relationship is sporadic and unsystematic 
and disappears as soon as it is discovered. 
But is it always discovered at once? It depends on the answer to this ques-
tion if the possibility of long-term interrelations between markets and the me-
dia and subsequent price movements away from fundamental values is admis-
sible or not. Experiences with the 1987 stock market crash and the internet 
bubble of the “New Economy” indicate that fits of collective panic or eupho-
ria repeatedly occur in the financial markets – and therefore stock prices 
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which reflect a limited market rationality. If coolly calculating actors try to 
derive speculative gains from trend following behavior, an essential regulative 
element is lost. It is conceivable that extreme price movements in particular 
persist for a certain period of time, if even those who know better do not take 
a different direction because the market risk is too high or because they hope 
for a profit.  
There is no doubt that the media as generators of attention possess the po-
tential to contribute to the “overdrive” of mass behavior: In times of a greatly 
increased media range, economic and non-economic events are today broad-
cast everywhere and in real time. The competitive situation on the media mar-
ket intensifies the exaggeration of the contents and an increase in their emo-
tional appeal through prominent placement and an eye-catching presentation 
of selected issues. The induction of an emotional public response in order to 
generate feedback effects constitutes a priority of today’s mass media, also of 
the business media. There is thus absolutely no doubt that the news flow of 
the mass media does not follow a random pattern. A homogenization of the 
market response is thereby certainly not prevented.   
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